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SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: A HISTORY OF
LIBERTY IN THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
WILLIAM R. MUSGROVE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States government has the power to create and enforce laws
that regulate society. This power is generally presumed to be
constitutional. However, "[t]here are limits to the extent to which the
presumption of constitutionality can be pressed, especially where the liberty
of the person is concerned.. ."' This limitation was demonstrated in 2003
when the United States Supreme Court struck down a Texas sodomy statute
in Lawrence v. Texas pursuant to the theory of Substantive Due Process.
2
In striking down the Texas statute, Justice Kennedy stated, "[l]iberty
protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling
or other private places. . . . Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct."' 3 This means there are certain areas of an individual's life that the
government has no right to intrude upon. Under the theory of Substantive
Due Process, a court can step in via the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause and provide substantive protection from government actions
that violate an individual's rights and liberties.4  This note explores
Substantive Due Process by examining how it came into being and where it
is going after Lawrence v. Texas.
II. THE HISTORY OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The theory of Substantive Due Process derives from the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process clause. The Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified after the end of the Civil War on July 9, 1868.' The first sentence
of the Fourteenth Amendment granted citizenship to all freed slaves.6 The
J.D. Candidate, 2008, The Florida State University College of Law. B.S., 2004, Univ. of Ga.
1. Skinner v. Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942) (Stone, H.F., concurring).
2. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
3. Id. at 562.
4. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law ... U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." Id. This sentence
was aimed specifically at overturning the decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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second sentence contains three key provisions: 1) the Privileges and
Immunities Clause,' 2) the Due Process Clause,8 and 3) the Equal
Protection Clause.9 This note focuses on the Due Process Clause.
Since its birth there has been much litigation over exactly what the Due
Process Clause means and what rights and protections it affords.
Eventually, three main types of Substantive Due Process cases emerged: 1)
Incorporation cases, 2) Economic Substantive Due Process cases, and 3)
Right of Privacy cases.' ° Most of today's Substantive Due Process
litigation, including Lawrence, revolves around the Right of Privacy.
However, it is instructional to have a basic understanding of the different
types of litigation that have shaped the history of Substantive Due Process.
A. INCORPORATION THEORY
There has long been debate over what rights and liberties are afforded
by the Constitution. Once a right or liberty is recognized, the question then
becomes, "who can claim that right or liberty, and under what
circumstances?" This was the problem faced with the Bill of Rights." The
Bill of Rights explicitly guarantees many protections and rights to the
People of the United States. However, an 1833 opinion by the Supreme
Court in Barron v. City of Baltimore hamstrung the effectiveness of the Bill
of Rights.'2 Barron held the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights
only protected against actions by the federal government, not actions by
state and local governments." The Barron Court reasoned the Bill of
7. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States..." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. It should be noted, however,
that in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79-83 (1873), the Supreme Court, for all intents
and purposes, "gutted" this clause. The Court held the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment only conferred two substantive rights to the People: 1) the right to come
to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon that government, and 2) the right
to demand the care and protection of the Federal government when on the high seas or within the
jurisdiction of a foreign government. The right to travel (within the United States) was added as a
right granted by the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). In
essence, however, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been
rendered ineffective.
8. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, supra note 5. This clause is explained further in the note,
p. 5 .
9. "... nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1. It should be noted that "equal protection" is a very broad area of the law
that encompasses civil rights and affirmative action. This paper will not explore this amazingly
dense area of the law.
10. There has also been much litigation about "Procedural Due Process," which the Supreme
Court has interpreted to be guaranteed via the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See,
e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). This
note, however, does not open that Pandora's Box.
11. The First through the Tenth Amendments are commonly referred to as "The Bill of
Rights."
12. 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
13. Id. at 247-48. It should be noted that that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments do not
provide any explicit right to the people of the United States. The Ninth Amendment states: "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people." U.S. Const. amend. LX. The Tenth Amendment states: "The
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Rights simply existed to ensure that a far distant federal government would
not encroach on the liberty of the people who were already governed by a
local and state government.
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The practical effect of Barron meant that a state or local government
could pass a law, or initiate a state action, that would run roughshod over
the Bill of Rights. Unless that law or action was at odds with that state's
Constitution, there was nothing an individual could do (outside of the
political process) to receive protection from that state law or action. This is
no longer the case today, so how did we come to understand that the Bill of
Rights affords protection from both federal and state actions?
The idea that the first eight amendments safeguard against federal and
state action was first mentioned in 1908 in Twining v. State of N.J.5
Throughout Twining, the Court toyed with the idea that a denial of the
protection of the first eight amendments against state action would be a
denial of due process of law. Ultimately, the Twining Court rejected this
notion; however, a seed was planted in the Court's garden.
In order to solve the problem of how to use the rights contained in the
first eight amendments to protect against state actions, the Court ultimately
decided to use a theory of Incorporation. The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that "no State shall deprive any person
of life, liberty or property without due process of law."' 6 Incorporation
involves integrating the rights of the first eight amendments into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which in turn makes these
rights applicable against the states.
Sixty years after Twining, the Court in Duncan v. State of Louisiana,
stated that in order to determine when one of the rights of the first eight
amendments is incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court must ask whether the "procedure ... [is] necessary
to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty. .""7 In other words, is
the right essential under the Anglo-American form of justice? If the right is
essential (i.e., it is a right or liberty that has long been recognized as
existing in America and Britain) and due process of law could not be met
without that right, then that right is incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. After Duncan, most of the rights
guaranteed by the first eight amendments were incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.' t Not all rights, however,
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const. amend. X.
14. Barron, 32 U.S. at 249-50.
15. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
16. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968).
18. The Supreme Court has incorporated the following provisions of the first eight
amendments via the Fourteenth Amendment: the First Amendment rights of speech, press, and
religion (see Fiske v. State of Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927)); the Fourth Amendment rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures (see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)); the Fifth
Amendment right to not be compelled to self-incrimination (see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
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were incorporated.' 9
Incorporation demonstrates how constitutional law evolves, and how
the Court creates ways to apply explicit rights to individuals. But, how
does the Court grant the protection of rights that are not explicitly written in
the Constitution? The next two areas of Substantive Due Process explore
this conundrum.
B. ECONOMIC SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Economic Substantive Due Process involves the Court using the theory
of Substantive Due Process to limit government regulations on economic
activities.20 In a typical case, the government would regulate an economic
activity, and the individual would claim the government was intruding on
his or her property interests21 under the theory that this was a violation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.22 The Court
would then step in and limit the government's intrusion on this activity.
The most famous case involving the theory of Economic Substantive
Due Process occurred in 1905 in Lochner v. New York.23 In Lochner, the
Court struck down a New York labor statute that prohibited bakery workers
from working more than sixty hours per week. New York argued that it
was simply using its police power to protect the health and safety of its
citizens. 4 The Court rejected this argument and held that the regulation
(1964)); the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial (see Duncan v. State of La., 391 U.S. 145
(1968)); The Sixth Amendment right to counsel (see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963));
the Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial (see Klopfer v.N.C., 386 U.S. 213 (1967)); the Sixth
Amendment right to public trial, (see In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)); the Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation of witnesses (see Pointer v. Tex, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)); the Sixth
Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses (see Washington v. Tex., 388
U.S. 14 (1967)); the Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive bail (see Robinson v. Cal.,
370 U.S. 660 (1962)); the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
(see Furman v. Ga., 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
19. Most notably, the Second Amendment's "right to bear arms." Also, the Third
Amendment has not been specifically adopted. However, it is fairly certain that one would not be
required to "quarter soldiers." Finally, the Seventh Amendment's "right to a jury in civil suits"
has not been applied to the states.
20. Many times, these "persons" were actually corporations. The idea that a corporation can
be a legal person still exists today. However, this was first recognized in this area of the law in
1886 in Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
21. This would typically be done by claiming an interference with liberty of contract.
22. The Fifth Amendment also has a Due Process Clause. It reads, "... nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. V. The only difference
between the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth's Due Process Clause is
the word "State" in the Fourteenth's clause. Therefore, there was no need for the Fifth's Due
Process Clause to be "incorporated" through the Fourteenth Amendment because Barron held the
First through Eighth Amendments specifically applies to federal government actions. For
example, when the Federal government regulated an economic activity, the individual would
claim a Fifth Amendment Due Process violation; when a state government regulated an economic
activity, the individual would claim a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process violation.
23. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
24. Apparently, at this time, being a baker was one of the more dangerous professions. Many
bakers seldom lived past fifty years and bakers often died of "white lung" disease. As Justice
Harlan points out in his dissent in Lochner, New York was attempting to protect the health and
safety of their citizens by limiting the amount of hours bakers had to work. Id. at 66-74.
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unduly interfered with the liberty of contract between the bakers and their
employers.
The Court derived the economic theory of "liberty of contract" from the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, there is no
liberty of contract provision to be found anywhere within the Fourteenth
Amendment, nor is there any reference to liberty of contract anywhere in
the Constitution. 26  Nevertheless, the Court stated that "[t]he right to
purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment.
."27 Although the Court did recognize that a State had the right to interfere
with liberty of contract under the State's police power to protect the health
and safety of its citizens, the Court did not believe it to be justified in this
instance. 28 What the Court did was substitute its judgment for the New
York legislature's judgment while at the same time inserting its own
personal policy about economics into the Constitution.
After the Lochner decision, the Court entered into what is now
commonly referred to as the "Lochner era. '"29 During this time, the Court
routinely struck down economic regulations under Substantive Due
Process. It is thought that the Lochner Court struck down at least two
hundred economic regulations citing Substantive Due Process.3" However,
even though the Court used Substantive Due Process to strike down a great
many laws, it sustained just as many regulations as it struck down.3"
The Lochner era came to an end in 1934.32 Ironically, the case that
signaled its end was another case involving the state of New York. In
Nebbia v. People of New York, the Court upheld a New York law that
regulated the minimum and maximum prices of milk.33 Under the Lochner
Court, this law would have been struck down because it interfered with the
liberty of contract that was protected by Substantive Due Process.
However, the Nebbia Court made an abrupt departure from the theory of
25. Id. at 63.
26. As Justice Holmes points out in his dissent, the Constitution does not explicitly protect
any economic right. Id. at 65 (recognizing the exception of the "Takings Clause"). He also
believed that the majority "perverted" the term "liberty" by using it in the manner they did, and he
implied this was simply a case ofjudicial activism. Id.
27. Id. at 53.
28. Id.
29. The Lochner era existed from 1905 to the mid-1930s.
30. See, e.g., Tyson & Bro.-United Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927)
(invalidating state law setting prices of theater tickets); Ribnik v McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928)
(striking down state law fixing prices charged by employment agencies); Louis K. Liggett Co. v
Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928) (invalidating state law restricting entry into pharmacy business);
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (invalidating state law regulating price of
gasoline); New State Ice Co. v Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (invalidating state law prohibiting
any person from manufacturing ice without obtaining required license).
31. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 724-25 (Richard A. Epstein et
al. eds., 4th ed., 2001). For a critique on the Lochner era, see Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's
Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987).
32. Its end came about because of the economic realities of The Great Depression and
President Roosevelt's court packing threats. See ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 57-58 (Free Press 1990).
33. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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Economic Substantive Due Process. The Court stated:
The general rule [as applied to when a state may regulate
economics] is that [use of property and freedom of contract] shall
be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights
nor contract rights are absolute .... The guaranty of due process...
demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and
substantial relation to the object sought to be attained. . . . The
Constitution does not guarantee the unrestricted privilege to engage
in a business or to conduct it as one pleases.34
This means that there is no "liberty of contract" any longer, nor are any
economic rights protected by the Due Process clause. After Nebbia, the
theory of Economic Substantive Due Process was officially dead.35
Finally, the Court held that it is within the power of the legislature to
make economic regulations. The Court stated, "price control, like any other
form of regulation, is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or
demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the Legislature is free to adopt, and
hence an unnecessary and unwarranted interference with individual
liberty."36 This means that a state economic regulation only violates Due
Process if it is completely irrational, arbitrary, or discriminatory on its face.
Since Nebbia, the Court has never struck down a state economic regulation
based on a Due Process violation. As the Court once noted, "[t]he day is
gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause ... to strike down state
laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be
unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought."37
C. RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Since the Nebbia Court killed Lochner's Economic Substantive Due
Process, does that mean Substantive Due Process is dead in its entirety?
Not quite. Even after Nebbia, a key idea of Substantive Due Process
remained: it could provide constitutional protection for rights and liberties
that were not enumerated in the Constitution. The Court recognizes certain
"implied fundamental rights" as being protected by the Constitution, but not
34. Id. at 523-28.
35. It remains so today. See infra p. 9.
36. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 539.
37. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). This is because the Court does
not want to substitute its view of economics for that of the legislator. In retrospect, the Lochner
decision was seen by many to be a prime example of judicial activism. SUNSTEIN, supra note 35,
at 874. It has been viewed as a wrong decision and even to this day, when a Justice on the Court
(usually in a dissenting opinion) feels another Justice on the Court is substituting their views on
economics for that of the Legislator, they will accuse the other Justices of "Lochnerizing" the law.
See MARY CORNELIA PORTER, LOCHNER AND COMPANY: REVISIONISM REVISITED, IN LIBERTY,
PROPERTY, AND GOVERNMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION BEFORE THE NEW
DEAL 12-17 (Ellen F. Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1989) (summarizing instances of Justices
claiming other Justices were Lochnerizing).
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enumerated. 8 It is natural to believe there are rights a society possesses
that are fundamental to its existence. However, a problem arises when an
individual claims the protection of these implied fundamental rights. The
problem arises as a matter of constitutional interpretation, 39 as illustrated
when an individual claims a law infringes on his or her right to privacy. °
The right to privacy is a broad area of Substantive Due Process.
Modern litigation surrounding Substantive Due Process often centers on the
right to privacy.41 The underlying idea is that there are certain areas of an
individual's private life that the government cannot intrude upon. Even
though the right of privacy is not enumerated by the Constitution, it is
nevertheless protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. In particular, it is protected as an implied fundamental right by the
liberty provision of the Due Process Clause. The right of privacy is an
umbrella that encompasses the fundamental rights of: 1) parental control
over the upbringing of their children;42 2) procreation;43 3) family;44 and 4)
private sexual activity.45
38. See e.g., infra n. 44-47.
39. Constitutional interpretation is the Court's basic function. However, there are many
schools of thought regarding exactly how the Court should interpret the Constitution. Of course,
every different Justice has his or her own philosophy on this matter. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA,
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997) (detailing current
Supreme Court Justice Scalia's personal philosophy on constitutional interpretation). An entire
treatise could be written on the varying views of constitutional interpretation, therefore this note
will not begin to even touch the surface of the matter. For the purpose of Substantive Due Process
and the right of privacy, the debate is whether there are certain "fundamental rights," including
the right of privacy, not enumerated within the Constitution that are nevertheless protected by the
Constitution.
40. There is no explicit mention of a "right to privacy" anywhere in the Constitution.
However, the Court has recognized the existence of this implied fundamental right and has also
recognized its protection by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause under the theory of
Substantive Due Process. See infra p. 17.
41. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
42. See Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of
Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 58 (2000).
43. See Skinner, 316 U.S. 535; Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
44. See Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Stanley v. Ill., 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Michael H.
v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
45. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. It should be noted that the Court has recognized the right
of privacy to include the right to make medical care decisions. This is the right of an individual to
refuse medical treatment, even lifesaving treatment. See Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dept. of Health, 497
U.S. 261 (1990). However, the Court has refused to recognize that the right of privacy guarantees
the right to physician-assisted suicide. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). For
more, see David A. Pratt, Too Many Physicians: Physician-Assisted Suicide After
Glucksberg/Quill, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 161 (1999).
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1. The Right of Parents to Control the Upbringing of their Children46
The notion of fundamental rights in relation to privacy began in the
1923 case of Meyer v. Nebraska.4 7 In Meyer, the Court struck down a
Nebraska law prohibiting the teaching of any modem language other than
English in any public or private grammar school. 8 The plaintiff was a
school teacher at a private parochial school in Nebraska that taught German
to the children of German immigrants. The law at issue banned the
teaching of German, French, Spanish, Italian, and "every other alien
speech."49 In striking down the law on Substantive Due Process grounds,
the Court held this law violated the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." The court then explained the
meaning of the word "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment:
The "liberty" guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.5'
It is important to note that the Court held that liberty was a common
law privilege. This means that liberty does not have to be defined by the
Constitution; it can be defined by the courts. In essence, a court can find an
implied privilege or right that is essential or fundamental and protect it
through the liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2
The Court further held that "the individual has certain fundamental
rights which must be respected. 5 3 The Court then held that parents have a
fundamental right to control the upbringing of their children, which
includes the right of a parent to determine how his or her child should be
educated. 4 The Court held that a state could not interfere with this right
simply by asserting its "police power." This is significant as it pertains to
46. This could likely be included under the "right to family." Because it provides the basis
for the right to privacy, it will be discussed separately. See infra, p. 12-13.
47. 262 U.S. 390. One could argue, however, that this notion has existed almost since the
beginning of the Court. In 1798, Justice Iredell and Justice Chase debated in Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. 386 (1798), as to whether there were certain inherent rights, or "natural laws," protected by
the Constitution.
48. Id. at 403.
49. Id. at 401. However, the law did not ban the teaching of Greek, Latin, or Hebrew.
50. Id. at 399.
51. Id. It should be noted that Meyer was decided within the Lochner era. Therefore, the
right of liberty of contract still existed.
52. Admittedly, this sounds very much like the Lochner court's reasoning with regard to
liberty of contract, or economic rights. However, an argument could be made that the inherent
difference between the right to privacy and the right of liberty of contract is that with the
exception of the Takings Clause, the Constitution does not provide any explicit protection for
economic rights, whereas it does provide many specific protections for individual rights.
53. Id.at401.
54. Id.
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the right of privacy because, although the right of privacy was not explicitly
recognized in this decision, it is implicit that there are certain areas of an
individual's private life, such as a parent's decision on how to control the
upbringing of their child, which a state does not have the authority to
intrude upon.
2. The Right to Procreate
In 1942, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court struck down an Oklahoma
statute that required a "habitual criminal," defined as an individual
convicted of three or more felonies of "moral turpitude," to be sterilized.5
This statute, however, only applied to "blue collar criminals," and not to
"white collar criminals."56 The effect of the statute's application was that
an individual would be sterilized for three or more convictions of armed
robbery, but not for embezzlement, even though the underlying offense of
both crimes was theft and the prison sentence for both crimes was the same.
In striking down the statute, the Skinner Majority decided the case on
Equal Protection grounds, not Substantive Due Process grounds. 7  It
recognized, however, that the sterilization statute "deprives certain
individuals of a right which is basic to the perpetuation of a race-the right
to have offspring."58 The Court further stated, "[w]e are dealing here with
legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race."59 In essence, the Court recognized a fundamental right to marriage
and procreation, even though neither is enumerated in the Constitution.
The Court reasoned that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause
because it protected a fundamental right of one group of individuals, but did
not extend the same protection to another group. The Court asserted:
"[s]terilization of those who have thrice committed grand larceny with
immunity for those who are embezzlers is clear, pointed, unmistakable
discrimination .... [and therefore violates the Equal Protection clause]."60
Although the Court declined to decide this case on Substantive Due Process
grounds, Chief Justice Stone held in his concurring opinion that the
Oklahoma statute was a violation of Due Process because it violated an
individual's "personal liberty."'"
55. 316 U.S. at 543.
56. The statute provided: "offenses arising out of the violation of the prohibitory laws,
revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses, shall not come or be considered with the terms
of this act." Id. at 537.
57. Commentators believe this case was decided on the basis of Equal Protection instead of
Substantive Due Process because the Court was trying to move away from any semblance of the
Lochner's reasoning. See William Cohen, Is Equal Protection Like Oakland? Equality As A
Surrogate For Other Rights, 59 TUL. L. REv. 884, 891-92 (1985).
58. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536.
59. Id.at541.
60. Id. at 541-42.
61. Id. at 544.
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As Chief Justice Stone stated, "[t]here are limits to the extent to which
the presumption of constitutionality can be pressed, especially where the
liberty of the person is concerned .. .," Therefore, even though Skinner
was technically decided on Equal Protection grounds, it is nevertheless a
key decision in the history of the right to privacy because it not only
recognized that the right to procreate and the right to marry were
fundamental, but also recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause could be violated when a state intruded on an individual's
personal liberty.
The right to procreate and the right to privacy were expanded in 1965 in
Griswold v. Connecticut.63 The Griswold Court struck down a Connecticut
statute which banned the sale of "any drug, medicinal article or instrument
for the purpose of preventing contraception."'  The Court once again
declined to decide the case on Substantive Due Process grounds, 65 instead
relying upon a theory known as the 'zone of privacy.' The idea is that
"guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees . . .[which] create zones of privacy. '"66 The Court
then held that the statute intruded on the marital relationship, thereby
violating the fundamental rights of privacy-specifically the rights of
marriage and procreation.67
Griswold also produced several concurring and dissenting opinions.
Concurring Justice Goldberg argued that the basis for finding a right of
privacy lies not within the penumbra and zone of privacy advocated by the
Majority of the Court, but within the Ninth Amendment.68 In his
62. Id.
63. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
64. Id. at 480.
65. The Court acknowledged that it was not using the Lochner case or Substantive Due
Process as grounds for striking down the statute. The Court stated that "[o]vertones of some
arguments suggest that [Lochner] should be our guide. But we decline that invitation .... Id. at
481. Once again, this was likely an attempt by the Court to distinguish its reasoning from the
failing Lochner rationale.
66. Id. at 484.
67. Id. at 486. It is interesting to note how the Majority opinion dances around the issue of
contraception and procreation. It never comes out and explicitly says that a married couple has
the right to use contraception. The court frames the issue as violating rights of privacy created
from the zone of privacy. It should also be noted that the "penumbra" and "zone of privacy" were
completely invented. The Court also never comes out and fully reemphasizes the right to
procreate. It merely says Skinner recognized a privacy right protected by the "zone of privacy."
See Id. at 485. The inference drawn is that Skinner stood for the recognition of a fundamental
right to procreate. As is often the case in Constitutional Law, one must look to later decisions to
derive a case's full meaning. As the Court explained in Carey v. Population Services, Intern.,
"[r]ead in light of its progeny, the teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual
decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State." 431 U.S. 678, 687
(1977).
68. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486-99. However, this approach has not been subsequently
addressed by the Court. Consequently, many commentators argue that the basis for protection of
implied fundamental rights lies not within Substantive Due Process, but within the Ninth
Amendment. For more on the interpretation of the Ninth Amendment, see Sol Wachtler, Judging
the Ninth Amendment, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. 597 (1991); Andrzej Rapaczynski, The Ninth
Amendment and the Unwritten Constitution: The Problems of Constitutional Interpretation, 64:1
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concurrence, Justice Harlan argued that the statute violated Due Process by
impinging on "important fundamental liberties" which were "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty."69 Justice White concurred and argued that the
statute violated Substantive Due Process because it impinged on liberty.7"
Justices White and Black both dissented in separate opinions and
argued they could not find the right of privacy anywhere within the
Constitution. Therefore, the Majority was doing nothing more than making
up rights and engaging in the same repudiated philosophy as the Lochner
Court.71 As in Griswold, the Court was moving towards finding a right of
privacy. Yet, they were still afraid of being accused of engaging in
Lochnerism. Therefore, the Majority was hesitant to use the term
"Substantive Due Process" when finding the Constitution protected a right
that was not enumerated.
No venture into the realm of the right of privacy would be complete
without a discussion of Roe v. Wade.72 As commonly understood, Roe
stands for the notion that it is a woman's right to have an abortion.73
However, a nuanced understanding of Roe reveals that the right to have an
abortion is derived from the right to procreate. In order for the Court to
reach this conclusion, it had to engage in a theoretical discussion of the
right to privacy, what it encompasses, and where it is derived from.
The Court determined that the Constitution never explicitly mentions
any right of privacy.74 Nonetheless, the Court argued that in the past, it had
recognized that a right of personal privacy exists.75 The Court expanded
upon this by asserting that only personal rights which are fundamental or
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" are guaranteed the protection of
the right of privacy.76 The Court then concluded that "the right of privacy
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 177 (1988); but see Bork, supra note 36, at 184-85.
69. Id. at 500.
70. Id. at 502-07.
71. Id. at 507-31. As was noted in supra note 41, invoking the Lochner Court is often used
as a way to disparage the reasoning of the Majority.
72. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
73. This is not quite accurate. In fact, this is a common misconception about Roe. While the
Roe Court recognized a woman's right to have an abortion, this recognition was not the actual
holding. Roe held that a state may not ban abortion without a compelling interest. The Court then
set up a trimester system to determine when a state has a compelling interest to ban abortion. For
the first trimester, the decision to conduct an abortion was up to the medical judgment of the
pregnant woman's physician. The practical effect of this was that if a physician agreed to conduct
an abortion during the woman's first trimester, the State could not prevent a woman from having
an abortion. Between the second and third trimester, the State could regulate abortion based on
the State's compelling interest in the health of the mother. This meant the State could only ban a
woman from having an abortion if a physician determined the mother's life would be at risk if she
had an abortion. Finally, after the third trimester, the State could ban abortions. The reasoning
behind this was that, because the fetus would have reached the point of viability, the State had a
compelling interest in protecting the life of the fetus. This restriction was subject to a health
exception for the mother, which meant a woman could still have an abortion after the third
trimester ifa physician deemed her life would be at risk if she carried the fetus to term. Id. at 165-
67.
74. Id. at 152.
75. Id.
76. Id. The Court says the right of privacy extends to "activities relating to marriage, .
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[is founded] in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty,"
and it includes a woman's right to an abortion." This was a giant leap
forward in the Court's thinking because it was explicitly recognizing the
right of privacy as an implied fundamental right, which is protected by the
liberty provision of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Thus, even though Roe is most often cited as a victory for women's rights
and pro-choice advocates, it was an even larger victory for Substantive Due
Process and implied fundamental rights.78
3. The Right to Family
The right to family is not one right, but many rights. It includes the
right to marry, as recognized in Skinner, despite being decided on Equal
Protection grounds.79 The Court again recognized the right to marry in
Loving v. Virginia.8' In striking down a Virginia statute banning interracial
marriages, the Court declared: "[m]arriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of
man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival."8 The Court held
the interracial ban violated not only the Equal Protection Clause, but also
the liberty provision of the Due Process Clause.82 Also included in the right
of family is the right to custody of one's children, as recognized in Stanley
v. Illinois,83 and in Michael H. v. Gerald D.84
Finally, included within the right of family is the right to keep one's
family together. This right was recognized in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland.85 In Moore, the Court struck down a city ordinance restricting
the types of family members that could live together. The Court held the
statute violated Substantive Due Process because "the choice of the
'extended family' pattern is within the 'freedom of personal choice in
matters of ... [private] family life [that] is one of the liberties protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 86 As these cases
demonstrate, the right to family is broad, and any government attempt to
procreation. ... contraception,... family relationships.... and child rearing and education." Id.
77. Id.
78. The Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834, 879 (1992), reaffirmed
Roe and also provided the explanation that the right to abortion was based on the right of privacy,
which is protected by Substantive Due Process. The Court stated Roe "determined that a
woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy is a 'liberty' protected against state interference by
the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 834.
79. 316 U.S. at 541. Once again, the right to family could almost certainly be traced back to
Meyer, just as the right to control the upbringing of one's children could be included within the
right to family. See supra note 47.
80. 388 U.S. at 12.
81. Id. (internal citations omitted). See also Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 385-86 (1978) (holding the
right to marry is a fundamental right of privacy implicit in the Due Process Clause).
82. Id. Once again, the Court does not explicitly say "Substantive Due Process," or "right of
privacy," but a violation of the liberty provision of the Due Process Clause is nevertheless a
Substantive Due Process violation.
83. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
84. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
85. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
86. Id. at 511 (quoting Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. V. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974)).
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regulate the traditional family arrangement will likely be a violation of
Substantive Due Process.87
4. Right to Private Sexual Activity
The right to private sexual activity is perhaps one of the most basic
forms of the right of privacy. It could be argued this right has been
implicitly protected since the right to procreate was first recognized as an
implied fundamental right. In any event, this right still requires its own
distinct category within the right to privacy.
The right to engage in private sexual activity is explicitly conferred in
Lawrence."8 However, in order to fully understand Lawrence, a discussion
of Bowers v. Hardwick is necessary.89 Bowers involved a Georgia statute
making it illegal for adults to engage in sodomy.9" Hardwick was arrested
pursuant to this statute for engaging in consensual sodomy with another
male in his own home.9' The Bowers Court framed the issue as whether the
Constitution protected a fundamental right of homosexuals to engage in
sodomy.92 The Court answered with a resounding "no."
The Majority opinion explained that in order for a fundamental right or
liberty to be granted the protection of the Due Process Clause, the right
must be one that was "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," or a
liberty which was "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."93
The Majority then stated: "[i]t is obvious to us that neither of these
formulations would extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in
acts of consensual sodomy."94 Under this reasoning, the Majority held the
statute to be constitutional.95
87. It is important to note the "traditional" aspect of the family. If the family is not a
traditional family (i.e., it involves same-sex marriage, polygamy, etc.), it is unlikely that the Court
would provide it any substantive protection under the Due Process Clause. See infra note 108.
For arguments that same sex-marriages should gain the protection of the right of privacy and
Substantive Due Process, see Pamela S. Katz, The Case For Legal Recognition of Same-Sex
Marriages, 8 J.L. & POL'Y 61, 73-84 (1999).
88. 539 U.S. at 578.
89. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
90. Id. at 188.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 190. Compare the way this issue is framed with how the Court frames the issue in
Lawrence, infra p. 18-20, note 101.
93. Id. at 191, 192 (quoting Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)).
94. Id. at 192. The Majority said that, quite to the contrary, laws which prohibit sodomy
have a firmly rooted tradition in the Nation. The Majority stated: "[slodomy was a criminal
offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original thirteen States when they
ratified the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the
37 States in the Union had criminal sodomy laws. In fact, until 1961, 50 States outlawed sodomy,
and today, 24 States and the District of Columbia continue to provide criminal penalties for
sodomy performed in private and between consenting adults. . . . Against this background, to
claim that a right to engage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious." Id. at 192-194
(internal citations omitted).
95. Id. at 196. Hardwick also claimed that even if the right to engage in sodomy was not a
fundamental right, the Georgia statute still violated Due Process because it purported to regulate
nothing more than morality. The Court responded by stating: "[t]he law, however, is constantly
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The Majority's opinion was met with a scathing dissent by Justice
Stevens.96 He argued that sodomy was protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, stating: "[t]he essential 'liberty' that
animated the development of the [right of privacy] surely embraces the
right to engage in non-reproductive, sexual conduct that others may
consider offensive or immoral."97  Justice Blackmun also dissented,
claiming the Majority betrayed the Nation's tolerance for non-conformity.98
Seventeen years would pass before another case concerning the right to
private sexual activity would come before the Court.
In 2003, the Court decided Lawrence, which once again involved a
state statute prohibiting sodomy. This time, however, the issue before the
Court was framed differently. The issue was "[w]hether petitioners'
criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home
violate their vital interest in liberty and privacy protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."99 With the issue framed in
this manner, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Majority of the Court,
answered with a resounding "yes."' 00
The Majority held the Texas statute unconstitutional, based on the
evolution of the right of privacy and Substantive Due Process.'0 ' The
Majority confirmed that "the protection of liberty under the Due Process
Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defining
the rights of the person."' 2 The Majority then held that a State or court
cannot "define the meaning of the [sexual] relationship [between adults]
absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects."'0 3 The
based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be
invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed." Id.
96. Id. at 214-220. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment and argued that because
sodomy was immoral (referring to Sir William Blackstone's quote calling sodomy "the infamous
crime against nature"), it was subject to State intervention. Id. at 196-97. Justice White also
concurred, expressing his reservations that the punishment for the crime of sodomy (up to 20
years in prison), if it were to be imposed, would create a "serious Eighth Amendment [prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment] issue." Id. at 197-98.
97. Id. at218.
98. Id. at214.
99. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. There were two other issues as well. One asked whether the
Texas statute violated Equal Protection, and the other asked whether Bowers should be
overturned. Id. However, the Majority declined to decide the case based on Equal Protection.
100. This is a prime example of how the Court can frame an issue to get the results it wants.
The Bowers Court framed the issue in a way that no Justice could say "yes." However, with the
way the issue in Lawrence was framed, a rational Justice would have a hard time saying "no."
101. The Majority looked at the "substantive reach of liberty under the Due Process Clause"
as it evolved from Meyer through Griswold, Roe and Carey. Id. 564-68.
102. Id. at 565.
103. Id. at 567. This is the "Harm Principle" made famous by John Stuart Mill. The
"institution the law protects" is referring to the traditional institution of marriage (heterosexual
marriage). The Majority later says that Lawrence "does not involve whether the government must
give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter." Id. at 578.
This is how the Majority attempts to "keep the lid on" Substantive Due Process as applied to
"same-sex marriage." For an analysis on whether this has been successful, see Lisa K. Parshall,
Redefining Due Process Analysis: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and the Concept of Emergent
Rights, 69 ALB. L. REV. 237, 249-281 (2005-2006). Justice Scalia, in his dissent, thinks the
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court then stated: "adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the
confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their
dignity as free persons."'
The Majority then turned their attention to Bowers. They stated the
Bowers Court got the "history and tradition" of sodomy wrong, claiming
that even though sodomy has been banned during the history of the Nation,
it has only been enforced for acts of sodomy in public and has rarely been
enforced for acts of sodomy in private." 5  Therefore, the Majority
concluded, no longstanding history or tradition existed for regulating
private acts of consensual sodomy.' 6 . The Majority then specifically over-
ruled Bowers. °7 Finally, the Majority stated: "[t]he State cannot demean
[homosexuals'] existence or control their destiny by making their private
sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause
gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of
the government."' 10 8
In dissent, Justice Scalia ridiculed the Majority for disregarding stare
decisis and dismissing Bowers. He argued the law had not changed enough
in seventeen years to overturn Bowers. °9 He also argued the Majority had
misinterpreted the facts regarding the "history and tradition" of sodomy:
"the only relevant point is that [sodomy] was criminalized-which suffices
to establish that homosexual sodomy is not a right 'deeply rooted in our
Nation's history and tradition.""'0  Finally, Justice Scalia warned that
Lawrence will someday lead the Court to recognize homosexual
marriage."' From the surface, Lawrence appears to have broadened the
right of privacy and Substantive Due Process.
III. CONCLUSION: THE STATE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS
Lower Courts have consistently declined to extend the holding of
Lawrence beyond its facts." 2 Lawrence has not been extended to cover
Majority is fooling itself in believing Lawrence "does not involve the issue of homosexual
marriage," since one can only entertain such a belief if "principle and logic have nothing to do
with the decisions of this Court." Id. at 605 (internal quotations omitted).
104. Id. at 567.
105. Id. at 568-72.
106. Id. at 573.
107. Id. at 578.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 586-92.
110. Id. at 596.
111. Id. at 596-605. There was also a concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor in which she
argued that she would have invalidated the Texas statute on Equal Protection grounds. Id. at 579-
85. Justice Thomas also dissented accused the Majority of substituting their judgment for that of
the Texas Legislature and engaging in "Lochnerism." He also said that he can find no right of
privacy anywhere within the Constitution. Id. at 605-06.
112. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec'y of Dept. of Children and Family Serv., 358 F.3d 804 (1 1th Cir.
2004) (declining to extend Lawrence to strike down Florida Ban on gay couple adoption of
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incest, gay marriage, gay couple adoption, or polygamy, despite the fact
that logic dictates that if banning one type of non-traditional human
relationship is unconstitutional, the government certainly cannot ban any
other type of non-traditional human relationship." 3 Therefore, Lawrence
appears confined to a narrow holding that Substantive Due Process and the
right of privacy bar states from criminalizing homosexual sodomy.
Lawrence has not been interpreted as affording same-sex marriage the
protection of Substantive Due Process.
Massachusetts allows same-sex marriage," 4 as do Canada and several
European countries. "' Four states recognize homosexual civil unions." 6
This reflects a trend that society is beginning to believe that homosexuals
share heterosexuals' implied right to marriage. The history of Substantive
Due Process demonstrates that the Court and the law evolve over time. It is
likely that Justice Scalia's warning will come to fruition, and the Court will
determine that Lawrence indeed stands for the right to same-sex marriage.
For now, Substantive Due Process is alive and well. Whenever an
individual claims a State is denying one of the rights afforded by the Bill of
Rights, Substantive Due Process is invoked. Whenever an individual
claims the right of privacy, Substantive Due Process applies. It is an ever-
evolving mechanism that adapts to not only the law, but to society's views
on fundamental rights. Although Substantive Due Process can be fickle at
times, it is still an important check on unwarranted government intrusion
into our lives. We would all do well to remember that there is no liberty
without Due Process under the law.
children). For more on this subject, see John Tuskey, What's a Lower Court To Do? Limiting
Lawrence v. Texas and the Right to Sexual Autonomy, 21 TOURO L. REv. 597 (2005).
113. Ultimately, the logic of Skinner may prevail over Lawrence, and the basis for allowing
same-sex marriage may be found on Equal Protection grounds, not Substantive Due Process.
114. Goodridge v. Mass. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that
Massachusetts had no rational basis for denying marriage to homosexual couples under the Equal
Protection and Due Process clauses of the its state Constitution).
115. See e.g., Belgium, Spain, The Netherlands. ILGA Europe, Marriage and partnership
rights for same-sex partners: country-by-country, http://www.ilga-
europe.org/europe/issues/marriage-and-partnership/marriage-and-partnership rights-forsame_s
ex.partnerscountrybycountry (last visited June 3, 2008).
116. National Conference of State Legislatures, Same Sex Marriage, Civil Unions and
Domestic Partnerships (May 2008), http://www.ncsi.org/programs/cyf/samesex.htm (last visited
June 3, 2008) (listing Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Vermont).
